### K

#### One general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and weakest die….[[1]](#footnote-1)

(Constitutional Rights Foundation, No Date, “BRIA 19 2 b Social Darwinism and American Laissez-faire Capitalism,” <https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-19-2-b-social-darwinism-and-american-laissez-faire-capitalism.html>)

"Society advances," Spencer wrote, "where its fittest members are allowed to assert their fitness with the least hindrance." He went on to argue that the unfit should "not be prevented from dying out." Unlike Darwin, Spencer believed that individuals could genetically pass on their learned characteristics to their children. This was a common, but erroneous belief in the 19th century. To Spencer, the fittest persons inherited such qualities as industriousness, frugality, the desire to own property, and the ability to accumulate wealth. The unfit inherited laziness, stupidity, and immorality. According to Spencer, the population of unfit people would slowly decline. They would eventually become extinct because of their failure to compete**.** The government, in his view, should not take any actions to prevent this from happening, since this would go against the evolution of civilization.

#### Evolution pulses through the bloodline of society. Survival is the prize and competition is its gatekeeper.

#### Queerness illuminates itself in the shadow of Darwinism demonstrating the mantra of “survival of the fittest” is not just a biological, but also social imperative. Whether it’s Pat Robertson’s statement that AIDS is “God’s way of weeding his garden,” or the attribution of queerness itself as a defect of “decadence,” queerness becomes the marker for society’s genocidal impulse to demonstrate that there are some populations that were born to die

Sedgwick 8 (Eve, Professor of English at Duke University, Epistemology of the Closet, second revised edition, California at Berkeley Press, p. 127-130)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist imaginaire. In our culture as in Billy Budd, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time after the human; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time after the homosexual are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations. 26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine luster this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked—in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.

#### The aff’s establishment of antitrust law is part and parcel of this Darwinian fantasy. The aspiration for greater competition law cannot be separated from the image of the nuclear family. The trope of the “corporate family” who was “organized around a family business”[[2]](#footnote-2) is the unspoken basis of Neo-Brandeisian economics that atomizes intimacy and care to biological kin. This enshrines a social network bent on the alienation of queer communities and communities of color calcifying permanent disparities

Drucker 15 (Peter Drucker, Editor of Against the Current, “Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism,” 2015)

Chapter 3 summed up the new gay normality in five features. As the introduction noted earlier, and as chapter 5 will explore in depth, the key imperatives of a radical queer sexual politics can be identified in opposition to those five features, point by point. Graphical user interface, text

Description automatically generated The five features of a radical queer sexual politics are not yet accomplished facts; they are still tasks to be tackled, dimensions to be fleshed out. While queer radicalism is inherently a politics of sexual liberation – which is the queerest thing about it – a queer politics has to involve more than being visibly, defiantly sexual in queer ways. Each of the five tasks for a queer politics has to take shape in organising tactics, as well as changes in personal and community life. To achieve full sexual liberation, a queer politics has to challenge and win power at the level of the economy, state and other sites where power is concentrated. Without a strategic project, queer radicalism dooms itself to perpetual marginality. Queer politics in this sense has barely begun to be invented. Defining queer politics in this way contradicts common-sense thinking about sexuality, and what has largely become common sense even among radical queers. For capitalist cultures organised around the divide between public and private, the sexual is pre-eminently private. Radical queers disagree, of course; we understand that heterosexuality is publicly ‘flaunted’ every day, and that genuine queer equality demands bringing queer sex into the public sphere and insisting on its public recognition.1 But most queers see the sexual as predominantly cultural. Disgusted with what passes for politics under neoliberal hegemony and leaning towards a wholesale anarchist rejection of the politics of large-scale organisations and state institutions, many queers see sexual politics as a domain of individual or small-group action and cultural production. Inventing a true queer politics must begin by challenging this dichotomy and refuting this fallacy. The cultural and the personal do not exist in a separate realm apart from the economic, the political and the social; they are constantly deployed and manipulated by the powers that be to produce economic, political and social outcomes that are in their interests. ‘Neoliberalism was constructed in and through cultural and identity politics’, as Lisa Duggan has pointed out. Moreover, radical cultural and personal change is only possible by transforming the state, economy and other structures that form the foundation of cultural and personal life, at both the micro level of individuals and small groups and the macro level of the city, nation, region and planet. Transformation will not be possible as long as ‘cultural and identity issues are separated, analytically and organizationally, from the political economy in which they are embedded’.2 An agenda for a radical sexual politics therefore has to address multiple cultural, social, economic and political issues. In subverting gender, it has to be closely connected to a socialist feminist programme for reproductive freedom. In practising queer inclusion and global and anti-racist solidarity, it needs to focus on cutting-edge struggles like those of queer youth and trans people, and solidarity campaigns against Islamophobia, cuts in aid to poor countries and the ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel as a pro-gay state. At the same time, it should start from visions of queer intimacy and ‘families of choice’ to define a radical yet unifying approach to the issue of same-sex partnership. This means opposing the privatisation of care and the transmission of class privilege, while exploring new ways of supporting parents and creating flexible forms for intimate relationships. Blurring the Boundaries Today there is a push in many countries to incorporate lesbian, gay, bisexual and even trans people into the prevailing sexual and family order. That order is structured under gendered capitalism by having the vast majority of children raised and socialised by at least one biological parent in families formed by sexually and romantically linked heterosexual couples. Particularly in regions where the nuclear family has been consolidated as the predominant capitalist household form, these are the families in which the great majority of lgbt children grow up. This means that at best, even in the most supposedly enlightened enclaves, lgbt people are bound to face a period of differentiation and alienation in coming to terms with their distinct identity. Their own process of family formation is bound to be exceptional and complex. In short, the best this order can offer lgbt people is a kind of second-class citizenship. lgbt lives in this situation entail a constant choice between, or more accurately a varying combination of, adaptation and ghettoisation. Most lgbt people can only survive, let alone prosper, by doing waged work in heteronormative companies or institutions. Their survival is made easier if they find steady partners who also have steady jobs, and even easier if they both have reasonably supportive heterosexual family networks to fall back on. But work and family life of this kind involves a constant process of adaptation, of having or failing to correct spoken or unspoken assumptions and weighing one’s own words and gestures. Even the places where most people spend their free time are heteronormative – witness the hostility evoked by queer kiss-ins in straight bars and sometimes by any public signs of same-sex affection. This is not necessarily a reflection of straight people’s prejudice or unwillingness to understand; it is simply the result of the heteronormative ways in which life is structured. So most lgbt people escape from the dominant forms of work, family and leisure or complement them with life in a separate lgbt world, made up of more or less mainstream gay bars, clubs and associations, and more or less alternative queer and trans scenes. Even in the absence of prejudice or discrimination, this is what gay normality consists of: a combination of life in a heteronormative world and retreat into an lgbt ghetto. In contrast to the homonormative model of lesbian/gay people as a minority caught between adaptation and ghettoisation, a queer radical politics can look to a future beyond the gay/straight binary. This is in keeping with the early objectives of lesbian/gay liberation, and with Herbert Marcuse’s vision of a generalised freeing up of human eroticism. It is in lgbt people’s interests to contest the heteronormative order and develop alternatives to it: not just a queerer ghetto, but communities beyond norms and ghettos. Radical queers challenge the social frontiers between gay and straight in different ways. One way is simply acting sexually in ways or settings that transgress society’s heterosexual norm – same-sex tongue-kissing in straight singles bars, for example. They assert what Scott Tucker once called ‘our right to the world’.3 The full range of issues and adversaries that they take on comes across in the list of focus groups that Queer Nation San Francisco had at its height: the streets; the media; the military; government institutions; universities; suburban malls; communities of colour; other countries

#### The aff’s call for more businesses, more individuals, and more communities to compete within the economy is homocapitalism and homonationalism par excellence.

Rao 15 (Rahul Rao, Senior Lecturer in Politics at SOAS University of London, “Global Homocapitalism,” Nov/Dec 2015, Radical Philosophy, <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/global-homocapitalism>)

Temples of global capitalism have become increasingly vociferous of late in their opposition to homophobia. In February 2014, shortly after Uganda’s President Museveni gave his assent to a draconian Anti Homosexuality Act, the World Bank announced that it was delaying a US$90 million loan to Uganda on the grounds that the law would adversely affect health programmes that the loan was intended to support. [1] Bank president Jim Kim justified the decision with the argument that ‘when societies enact laws that prevent productive people from fully participating in the workforce, economies suffer.’ [2] In the same month, the Bank published a study estimating that homophobia and the exclusion of LGBT people cost the Indian economy between 0.1 per cent and 1.7 per cent of its GDP in 2012.3 Both the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have contributed to the It Gets Better viral video campaign, launched to dissuade queer young people from committing suicide, with short films featuring LGBT staff speaking about growing up queer and being out in their personal and professional lives. [4] In August 2015 The Economist magazine launched ‘Pride and Prejudice’, which it describes as ‘a comprehensive global initiative tackling the business and economic case for LGBT diversity and inclusion’. Culminating in a public event to be held in London in March 2016, the initiative aims to bring together over 200 leaders from the worlds of business, politics and society to catalyse debate on the ‘economic and human costs of discrimination against the LGBT community’. [5] In this article I ask why leading institutions of global capitalism have begun to take activist stances against homophobia, and why they have done so now. I want to understand the terms on which the figure of the queer has come to be adopted as an object of concern for the development industry. Rather than pretending to offer a ‘balanced’ assessment of what is being called the ‘business case’ for LGBT rights, I am interested in thinking through how a radical queer anti-capitalist politics might relate to this emerging discourse. Central to the initiatives mentioned above is a common-sense understanding of homophobia as a cultural disposition that might be disincentivized through the deployment of economic carrots (the promise of growth) and sticks (the withdrawal of capital). Revisiting debates over recognition and redistribution politics, I argue that viewing homophobia as ‘merely cultural’ enables international financial institutions (IFIs) to obscure the material conditions that incubate homophobic moral panics, and their own culpability in co-producing those conditions. Positioning themselves as external to the problem they seek to alleviate, IFIs are able to cast themselves as progressive forces in a greater moral struggle at precisely the historical moment in which austerity and capitalist crisis threaten to bring them into ever greater disrepute. In sum, through a critical survey of recent IFI initiatives on homophobia, I attempt to delineate the emerging contours of what I call ‘global homocapitalism’. Queering ifis Sexuality has long been central to the development agenda, but it has tended to be implicit and framed as the driver of a host of problems, including ‘overpopulation’, reproductive health, sexual violence and disease. Focused on regulation and risk management, the development industry has tended to ignore the more positive and affirmative dimensions of sexuality. And it has, until recently, been deeply heteronormative in its understanding of desire. [6] As Gilles Kleitz puts it, ‘The poor simply can’t be queer, because sexual identities are seen as a rather unfortunate result of western development and are linked to being rich and privileged. The poor just reproduce.’ [7] Nonetheless, the statements and initiatives cited at the start of this article suggest that something is beginning to change. HIV/AIDS has been pivotal in forcing an acknowledgement of the diversity of sexualities and prompting interventions targeted at communities deemed to be especially at risk. Sexual rights victories on issues such as decriminalization of same-sex conduct, recognition of same-sex marriage and adoption rights, and access to gender transition in countries across Europe and the Americas have in turn led international development bureaucracies based in these countries to fund projects dealing with sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) elsewhere. The growing prominence of SOGI issues as a development concern is also linked to the increasing propensity of development workers themselves to identify as LGBT in their professional lives. Andil Gosine has traced how the founding in 1993 of GLOBE (the World Bank’s LGBT staff association) was instrumental in getting staff to come out at work and to lobby the Bank for better benefits, but also, eventually, in prompting the Bank to exercise political leadership on HIV/AIDS and to support LGBT advocacy in the global South. [8] Understanding the terms on which new issues are incorporated into the agenda of the Bank can tell us quite a lot about the motivations underpinning such moves. In this regard, I suggest that we have much to learn from the Bank’s longer history of engagement with (cisgendered heterosexual) women as a development constituency. In a study of this engagement, Kate Bedford argues that gender work became central to the Bank’s fashioning of a post-Washington Consensus. Stung by criticism of its ill-fated structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, which typically demanded liberalization, deregulation and a downsizing of the state in exchange for Bank assistance, the post-Washington Consensus purported to recognize the importance of the state. It abandoned conditionality for a commitment to borrowing-country ‘ownership’ of policymaking and partnership with civil society, and it identified good governance, social safety nets and targeted poverty reduction as key priorities. The family, and especially poor women, became crucial sites for the Bank in demonstrating its commitment to a kinder, more inclusive and humane approach to economic growth. [9] In this, we might see the Bank as exemplifying the long-standing tendency of imperial governmentality to legitimate its will to power in humanitarian justification – what postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak has pithily described as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’. [10] More specifically, guardians of capitalism have always sought to anchor capitalist social relations in extra-market moral justifications, ranging from the libertarian virtues of meritocracy and individual self-worth in neoconservative defences of capitalism to more welfarist concerns such as gender empowerment in neoliberal variants thereof. [11] As Bedford argues, previous Bank gender policy had been criticized for overlooking the double burden placed on women when they entered formal employment, and for ignoring men altogether. Nonetheless the conviction that women were empowered by formal employment remained central to Bank lending. Simultaneously, Bank research on poor men was beginning to suggest that economic hardship engendered a crisis in masculinity when men could no longer play the role of breadwinners. Bedford demonstrates how these critiques and insights produced a new model of intimate attachment that became central to post-Washington Consensus projects, wherein the Bank moved from a breadwinnerhousewife model of domesticity to a two-partner sharing model of love and labour in which women were encouraged to work more outside the home while men were urged to take on greater domestic caring responsibilities. [12] Crucially, Bedford underscores that the new gender regime effectively (re-) privatized responsibility for social reproduction, consistently privileging fatherhood promotion over state provision of childcare in a number of projects. Nonetheless it appealed to a range of different constituencies because its benefits appeared unqualifiedly desirable: greater sharing of the domestic labour of social reproduction was, after all, an unimpeachably feminist goal. Ultimately, the success of the Bank’s new gender regime rested on its ability to link the dual imperatives of efficiency and empowerment: greater female employment in the market promised to liberate traditional gender relations, and better gender relations promised a more efficient allocation of labour resources. [13] Thus, gender relations were reimagined in ways that purported to serve neoliberal and feminist goals. Although Bedford’s study suggests that the Bank was wedded to a heteronormative model of domestic intimacy, there are striking continuities between its reformulation of ideal heterosexual relations and its more recent interest in queer subjects. Describing the post-Washington Consensus interest in poor men, Bedford notes a tendency to think of poverty as engendering a humiliated masculinity, which manifests itself in irresponsible behaviour such as alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual violence and child neglect. These beliefs generate an insistence in Bank policy that ‘poor countries are more sexist than rich ones, and that markets transform gender relations in unequivocally more efficient and empowering directions’. [14] We can see in some of the Bank’s LGBT initiatives the analogous premiss that poor countries are more homophobic than rich ones. While lacking the status of an official policy pronouncement, the Bank’s It Gets Better video (2011) is revealing of the pervasiveness of this assumption. It features an employee reflecting that ‘some [of his colleagues] had it easy coming out. But some others had it difficult. Specially those from developing countries.’ [15] Explaining why it might be difficult for IMF staff to come out at work, one speaker on the Fund’s It Gets Better video (2013) notes that ‘a lot of people at the Fund come from societies that are much less welcoming of gay people and that is a baggage that you don’t leave at the door when you come to the IMF. It’s very hard to overcome that, I think, for people who come from those societies.’ [16] Yet another speaker in the IMF clip elaborates helpfully: ‘We have so many people from all over the world working here, and their ideas of sexuality, of orientation, of how things are supposed to be … it’s all very different. You have anything from progressive Western countries to traditional Eastern countries or African nations or Latin America. And everybody has a different perspective.’ [17] The pervasiveness of these attitudes among Bank staff is borne out by Gosine’s ethnographic work on GLOBE. Asking why gay white men seemed to be overrepresented in its membership relative to the gender and geographical balance in the overall makeup of the Bank’s staff, Gosine teases out two barely disguised assumptions that recurred in his interviews: first, that heterosexual people who were non-white or not from Western countries were more likely to be homophobic; second, that women and non-white men who were not heterosexual hesitated to come out and to join GLOBE because they faced overwhelming ‘cultural’ pressures to remain closeted. [18] Eliding ‘culture’ and levels of ‘development’, these discourses participate in what Jasbir Puar has influentially described as ‘homonationalism’, whereby LGBT rights have become a new marker for old binaries (civilized/savage, developed/less developed). [19] But they do considerably more. In their subversive reworking of the IMF It Gets Better video, the Greek conceptual audiotextual performance duo FYTA suggests that the video is also an artefact of ‘pinkwashing’ in its implicit yoking of its neoliberal economic mission with a ‘civilizing’ anti-homophobic project. [20] Overlaying the IMF video with subtitled commentary, FYTA punctures the monotonously familiar coming-out narratives of well-groomed, largely white, male, upper-middle-class professionals uttered against an aural backdrop of anodyne elevator music, with viciously snarky political and psychoanalytic critique. The most productively jarring moments in the performance come when we are reminded of the dissonance between the values that the individuals featured on the video seek to reclaim from their personal struggles, and those that they promote through their work. When a lesbian Haitian staffer bemoans her upbringing in a Haiti where ‘you don’t hear people talking about gays and lesbians in a very positive way’, FYTA reminds us that Haiti’s contemporary political predicaments can, in quite significant measure, be traced back to the devastation of its agricultural sector by IMF policies foisted on the country in 1986 in return for desperately needed financial assistance. When IMF managing director Christine Lagarde appears on the video to affirm that she wants to head an organization where ‘everybody has to be able to be who they are, and they have to be comfortable, respected, proud of their difference’, FYTA reminds us of Fund policies imposing ‘user fees’ that made education and health care inaccessible to the poorest in many borrowing countries. Beyond the specific instances of hypocrisy that FYTA draws our attention to, there is something apposite about this critique being offered by queer Greek voices in the current conjuncture. Although FYTA is deeply invested in deconstructing Greek nationalism, committing itself in its self-description to ‘wiping out notions of Greek tradition and Greekness’, it is not incidental that its critique should have emerged from Greece. Indeed it does not take much to imagine how self-evidently absurd it must appear to queer Greeks to hear the IMF promise that ‘It Gets Better’, even as it participates in imposing draconian austerity measures on their country. If the It Gets Better videos can be dismissed as amateur efforts that are unrepresentative of IFI policy, this certainly cannot be said about the Bank’s more recent attempts to build an economic case against homophobia. Its 2014 report estimating the cost of homophobia to the Indian economy, authored by economist Lee Badgett, is revealing of the Bank’s emerging interest in queer sexuality. The basic argument is simple enough. Homophobia imposes avoidable costs on economies by lowering productivity and output as a result of employment discrimination, reducing investment in human capital as a result of discrimination in education, and widening health disparities between heterosexual and queer people thanks to the disproportionate risk of HIV/AIDS, violence, depression and suicide borne by the latter. Offering a conservative estimate of these costs as amounting to 0.1–1.7 per cent of 2012 GDP in its chosen case study India, the Bank seeks to incentivize governments to end homophobia by quantifying the economic growth that they would enjoy as a consequence of doing so. [21] Once again, the Bank advances an efficiency rationale for gender empowerment, which appears incontrovertibly good because ending homophobia is desirable for its own sake. Yet in unpacking what is at stake here we must ask not only what the Bank is doing for queers but also what queers are doing for the Bank. As FYTA’s pinkwashing critique of the IMF suggests, a radical agenda is effectively conscripted in the service of the capitalist imperative of expanding output, productivity and markets. Queer visions of the good life become mortgaged to limitless growth, which is itself further insulated from environmental, equity, and other critiques. Beholden to capitalism, the prospects for a queer Green or a queer indigenous politics become increasingly remote. In the political context of the Bank’s work in India, the Bank’s overtures to queers should invite us to interrogate the queer movement’s relations with other social movements – those of farmers, fishworkers and adivasis (forest dwellers) to name only a few – that have struggled against the effects of Bank-led policies for decades. As with queer Greeks and the IMF, it is sobering to imagine what queer adivasis might make of a Bank project that hailed their participation (as queers) in the very processes that are destroying their lifeworlds (as queer adivasis). That the intersectionality of queer and adivasi is virtually unthinkable in the imaginary of the Bank and possibly the mainstream of the queer movement in India begs important questions that I cannot do justice to here. A second problem concerns the deeply reductive account of freedom as participation in the market which appears to animate this project. There is something profoundly troubling about a strategy that makes respect for personhood contingent on the promise of that person’s productivity were their personhood to be fully recognized. To do so is of course not to treat persons as ends in themselves. But it should also prompt us to wonder about the implications of strategies that premiss full citizenship on productivity for those who find themselves unable or unwilling to be ‘productive’ within the terms of the market – the disabled, the unemployed, the elderly, the ‘development’-induced displaced. One consequence of the increasingly tight link between personhood and productivity is that public support for welfare for the ‘unproductive’ becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, especially in a climate of austerity.

#### Thus, vote neg to adopt queer desire – traditional economic study creates a disembodied and apathetic politic that enables the extermination of those deemed unqualified or refuse participation.

Heilger 15 (Evangeline Heilger, Mellon Visiting Assistant Professor of Public Discourse in American Sudies at Smith College, “Possibilities of Queer Desires and Economic Bodies (Because ‘The Economy’ Is Not Enough),” GlassHouse Book, 2015)

Working in ‘the economy’ alone couldn’t satisfy our needs. It still cannot. Trashpicking is just one example of an economic innovation by poor, queer, and working-class people in response to laws and policies that ignore the needs of marginalized folks. Yet rarely are these innovations acknowledged in traditional economic study; they become visible only as ‘alternatives to’ capitalism, and only if economic gains are quantifiable. In development studies, such activities are denigrated as ‘economies of affection’, viewed within that framework as a cause for poverty and a hindrance to progress (Escobar 1995; Scott 1996). The full range of economic activities enacted by poor, queer, and working-class people is missing from economic analysis. As noted by Binnie, class is an analytic of power by which people are differentiated from one another on the basis of differential access to material inequalities. Binnie argues for the integration of class into an intersectional analysis of sexuality, and an integration of sexuality into an intersectional analysis of class. This chapter answers Binnie’s call by utilizing an intersectional sexuality–class analysis of different economic innovations by poor, queer, and working-class folks. I have a queer desire. I want to convince you that there are worlds of economic activities that go unnoticed in traditional economic study. My goal is to explain the benefits of those ‘other activities’ – the alternative capitalist and noncapitalist activities – despite their being marked as ‘outside’ wage-earning capitalism. I want you to value them because they matter to people’s survival. To do this, I have to blend some strangely personal queer, poor, and working-class stories with a scholarly attempt to dethrone ‘the economy’ as a unified, closed system. Economic bodies: multiplying vulnerable desires I argue that queer desires inspire people to engage in clusters of nonnormative economic arrangements. These clusters of economic activity can best be understood metaphorically as ‘economic bodies’. I imagine these economic bodies engaging the world much like living and nonliving bodies interacting with other living and nonliving bodies. They take in nutrients and excrete waste. They create and destroy, mimic and hide, hibernate, reproduce, and die (although not necessarily in that order).2 One could consider capitalism as one type of economic body, although certainly not the only type. Economic bodies consist of people, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, as well as non-human substances (e.g. food, plants, minerals, currencies), and actions such as labor, exchanges, and gifting. Economic bodies can exist at a large scale, similarly to how ‘capitalism’ is conceived, or at smaller scales such as micro-economies, families, groups, and individuals.3 The relationships of and between economic bodies can be understood only through engaging a radical analysis that incorporates intersectional analytics of power, including but not limited to gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, nationality, embodiment, and other structural forms of power.4 Why not then use the term ‘actor’ as developed by Callon and Latour in actornetwork theory (also known as ANT)5 (Callon and Latour 1981; Callon 1986, 2005; Latour 1987, 2005)? Latour’s ‘actor’ calls to mind a human being who acts in relation to others, and whose actions can only be understood in connection to others, similarly to how I describe economic bodies functioning relationally to other bodies. Callon describes ‘actors’ as being made up of ‘human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc.’ (Callon 2005: 4). My description of economic bodies again aligns, although it elaborates further. My observations of green, queer, and alternative economies (Heiliger 2011, 2012, 2013) leads me to articulate three reasons to use the metaphor of ‘bodies’ in this chapter – rather than ‘actor’, ‘economy’, or ‘economic actor’ – to describe an assemblage of people, parts, relationships, and actions that make up economic activities: (1) to pluralize and multiply economic systems; (2) to emphasize the vulnerability of the human bodies living and working under conditions of structural inequality;6 and (3) to utilize the power of metaphor to insert images of vulnerable economies in the minds of readers. While ANT allows for a multiplying and plurality of economies via its concept of ‘networks’, in which multiple ‘actors’ can (inter)act, ANT does not meet the other two characteristics of green/queer/ alternative economies.7 My purpose in using ‘bodies’ as a metaphor is to call to mind both the humans included in economic activities and their vulnerability, a vulnerability mirrored in economic bodies. In Precarious Life, feminist and queer scholar Judith Butler writes that the vulnerability of our bodies is what connects us to one another. Our bodies signal ‘dependency, vulnerability, agency: the skin and flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch and to violence’ (2004: 26). This vulnerability of bodies is also what creates porousness: a body’s capacity to help and to harm, to be assisted and to be hurt is interwoven with the dependency of bodies (Butler 2004). Economic bodies are equally vulnerable, a point which I address later in this section. I pluralize the metaphor of body, using ‘economic bodies’ (rather than economic body) to counter powerful existing metaphors that promote the idea of a singular, unified, economic totality such as ‘the body of Capitalism’ and ‘the Market’. In making this argument, I align with Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006) in recognizing multiple forms of capitalism and the need to partially dis-unify the powerful ideology of ‘the economy’ or ‘Capitalism’ as a closed system. I also draw on embodiment theorists in recognizing the porousness of bodies, and on queer theorists to articulate how queer desires are pursued through economic bodies. The communal, polymorphous, intersubjective components of queer, feminist, and embodiment theories amplify the metaphor of ‘bodies’. The communal, polymorphous, and intersubjective components also diffuse the idea of a monolithic economic process such as ‘the market’ or ‘capitalism’ into easily recognizable clusters of activity. It becomes possible to see my mother’s teaching job, neighborhood foodsharing, charity clothing donations, and trashpicking as a connected cluster of economic activity that enabled my family’s survival, rather than as a capitalist economic activity (teaching job) and several alternative capitalist and noncapitalist activities. Therefore, reading this metaphor of economic bodies through recent scholarship allows a more complex picture of multiple economic processes, particularly those utilized by poor and other marginalized people as survival strategies. It may appear that the difference between ‘body’ and ‘bodies’ as an economic metaphor is so slight as to be insignificant. Yet recent studies by cognitive scientists Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011, 2013) demonstrate that even slight, oneword differences in the metaphor used to describe a social or political issue can have profound impacts upon decision-making processes by individuals. Metaphors influence the kinds of solutions we think of and also direct us towards solutions that are consistent with the metaphor (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011). Furthermore, metaphors influence our thinking whether or not we are explicitly aware of the metaphor’s role in our decision-making process (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2013). Therefore, I argue that those who consider all economic activities part of a singular, unified entity such as ‘the economy’ will seek out economic solutions for a singular, unified economy, convinced these are the best solutions regardless of data. If the same people are willing to think of economies as bodies – as lots of different kinds of ‘people’ moving through the world interacting with other ‘people’ – they will look for economic solutions that meet the needs of diverse people who will function best by interacting with others to meet their needs.8 I propose bodies as a metaphor for economies because human bodies are not closed systems; they have complex interactions with other bodies and their environments via border crossings of flesh and consciousness ‘more porous than previously imagined’ (Grosz 2001). My family’s intimate engagement with other people’s refuse is one example of blurred boundaries: between us and other families; between work-for-pay and nonmarket activity; and between what no longer has possibility (trash) and what newly has possibility (trash-turned-treasure). Klapeer and Schönpflug concept of ‘queer commons’ in Chapter 9 of this volume illustrates the porous boundaries of human bodies more fully. If one considers identity as something formed in relation to others, rather than owned by one’s individual self – as argued by Klapeer and Schönpflug – then my family’s class identity and my mother’s queer desires formed in relation to multiple others, both within and adjacent to our class. Human contact is porous in its overlaps: fingerprints left on trash meet fingerprints on trash-turned-treasure,9 creating liminal spaces where my family’s queerly classed identity was formed and re-formed. We interacted with one another as family members sharing the same material and social resources, and we brushed up against those whose trash became a means to my family’s desires and survival. Moira Gatens (1996) argues that the permeability and transitivity of human bodies is possible with any ‘body’ with which we have an affective relation, including corporate social bodies. Pushing out from Gatens, I suggest that economic bodies, as a form of social body, are controlled through human forces, behave in human ways, actively engage with other economic bodies, and utilize forms of social control and power. Bodies are vulnerable to racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and ableism (Butler 2004), which serve neoliberal aims through their visual and discursive association both with certain human bodies and with nonnormative economic bodies. Nonnormative economic bodies include intelligent, deliberate, and relationship-making processes such as bartering, gifting, trading, careshift collectives, trashpicking, and repurposing. However, these economic activities are frequently racialized, feminized, eroticized, and colonized, imagined in economic discourse as geographically located in the global south or in ‘inferior’ areas of the global north (e.g. inner-city urban or lower-class rural) (Escobar 1995). What we imagine about bodies interrelates with the socio-historic formations of economic realities and current understandings of economic ‘truth’. Thus stereotypes about human bodies are transferred onto what we imagine about economic bodies, and imaginings about economic bodies cross the borders of ‘social bodies’ and become soaked up by the sponginess of the diverse human bodies that labor in the environments of that particular economic body. The bodies of the people in an economy – in an economic body – create meaning for that economy. What we imagine about bodies, our own and others’, has powerful effects on how we relate to those bodies. This transitivity of bodies from material to imagined and back again in simultaneous time, combined with the spongelike ability of bodies to hold multiple meanings, is what I refer to here as the porousness of bodies, both human and economic. How then might we use this porousness of bodies to imagine and engage in productively promiscuous economies? I take up this question in this chapter, offering five examples of porously queer economies that function like human bodies:10 a single-mother desiring beautiful furniture, art, and possibility despite living in poverty; a homeless person making a livelihood on their own terms; medically altering one’s body to better match one’s gender regardless of age or ability to pay; moving cross-country despite being told that persons with disabilities ought to be satisfied with their current living situations; and creating social healing through cultivating queer black intergenerational community across state lines and in the absence of legal ties. I demonstrate that these queer desires inspire complex weavings of market, alternative market, and nonmarket economic activities. These blended activities in pursuit of queer desires are what I call ‘queer economies’. Queer economies I define queer economies as economic bodies animated by queer desires. J. Jack Halberstam defines queerness as referring ‘to nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity in space and time’ (2005: 6). The ‘queer’ part of queer desires, in this chapter, signals desires shaped by nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time. When queer desires motivate economic bodies, we can see that queer economies are shaped and moved by human bodies pursuing queer desires. Because queer economies blend economic activities, these kinds of economic bodies have radical potential for transformation, extending options to survive and thrive through deliberately relational activities such as bartering, trading, careshift collectives, and trashpicking. Another feature of queer economies is their engagement with the erotic. In her seminal essay ‘Toward a Queer Ecofeminism’ (1997), Greta Gaard articulates how Western culture’s devaluing of women, nature, and colonized peoples parallels a devaluation of both queerness and the erotic. Scholars such as Arturo Escobar (1995) and Catherine Scott (1996) have made similar claims that economic development discourse conceptually connects nature, women, indigenous people, and colonized nations. Given Gaard’s eco-feminist theorization that colonization projects attempting to stamp out queer expressions of gender and sexuality simultaneously created a fear of the erotic (1997), I am intrigued by the idea that erotophobia might be preventing us from valuing a range of economic bodies. Can we conceive of nonnormative economies as queerly erotic bodies, sparking and enflaming queer desires? I can imagine them flaming, butch, dyke, crip, leather, trans\*, closeted, polyamorous – even dandy! Yet I wish also to include ‘punks’ and ‘welfare queens’ amongst these queerly defined and imagined economic bodies that inspire queer desire (Cohen 1997: 438). For Cathy J. Cohen, using ‘queer’ politically allows for an expansive definition of identities linked to sexuality, labor, and visibility, a definition that includes those who blur gender/ sexual boundaries as well as unmarried mothers or youth who reject capitalism in favor of anarchy. When our queer economies rub up against the skin of other queer economies, there lies powerful potential for desire and economy outside the (re)productive. I suspect many forms of queer economy go unnoticed because they represent refusals to ‘sleep with’ or ‘be faithful to’ a white hetero-malecapitalism. Thus, just as lesbians and queer women may be punished for refusing sexual availability to heteronormative demands, so too are queer economies deplored, ignored, and decimated for cheeky ‘failures’ to live up to capitalist expectations of profit, efficiency, and progress. One example of a ‘failure’ to properly engage capitalism is that of contemporary trashpickers in LA County. They are typecast as homeless, male, dirty, and incapable of making rational decisions for their own well-being.11 Yet evidence about scavenging demonstrates that at least some of those assumptions are false: collecting recyclables is a consistent means to make money. It requires skill and awareness, planning and follow-through. Trashpicking also requires patience and a certain amount of strength and mobility, although it doesn’t have to be one’s own legs or arms – wheelchairs and grabber-sticks are useful tools (Farrell 2006). Scavenging can be effective in teams or solo, or by collaborating with someone for company while collecting for oneself. Trashpicking allows for making a livelihood on one’s own terms outside of or in addition to work for pay. I list trashpicking as evidence of queer economy, partly because my own queer survival has depended upon it. I see it in action in every place I have ever traveled or lived. Trash also brushes uncomfortably against the erotic, frequently cast in moral terms as a judgment: as dirty, unclean, something to be discarded and not thought about again. Those who engage in close, embodied contact with trash are categorized in the same way as the trash itself: disposable, unclean, and certainly not compatible with a middle- or upper-class status. At the same time, the embrace of ‘trashiness’ in popular culture – understood as a gendered and sexualized cultural performance – leaves me loath to romanticize trashpicking. It is dirty work, but hardly immoral: one might even argue that repurposing keeps valuable resources out of landfills and reduces greenhouse gasses, thereby improving local environments. This is where feminist, queer, and antiracist theories help us to see the language and practices used to denigrate particular human bodies. I propose that when we hear sexist, racist, ableist, classist, homophobic, or trans\*phobic comments, there is an opportunity to observe queer economies that challenge the unity, singularity, and totality of ‘capitalism’. Why do I suggest that economies function like bodies? Contemporary English-language economic discourse frequently touts both the singularity of economy – ‘the economy is sick’ – and economy’s presumed human qualities – ‘the economy is sick’. Existing descriptions of economies as gendered, racialized, disabled, and otherwise anthropomorphized in human terms bolster my claim that economies are already conceived at least partially in embodied terms. The anthropomorphized terms rely on a Western framework that values certain ‘masculine-affiliated’ qualities over ‘feminine-affiliated’ others. Catherine Scott illuminates that the gendered nature of economic discourse is fundamental to imbuing imperial and capitalist regimes with unearned power (1995: 4). Yet within this gendered, anthropomorphized language is ‘the economy’s’ Achilles heel. The tendency to anthropomorphize ‘the economy’ also serves to break down an image of the economy as singular: ‘the’ economy is variously described as masculine, feminine, hard, soft, sick, dying, racialized, reproducing, and lazy. In paying attention to such discourses, one can only conclude that ‘the economy’ consistently changes genders, has multiple personalities, or is not as singular in form as dominant hegemonic discourse would lead us to think. Each of these scenarios holds promise for imagining multiple, diverse economic bodies. Those invested in racism, sexism, ableism, erotophobia, heteronormativity, nationalisms, and colonial power are likely to take my suggestion that there are as many kinds of economies as there are types of human bodies as proof of the superiority of capital ‘c’ Capitalism (Gibson-Graham 1996), much as they take for granted the privileges and power granted to bodies upholding whiteness, maleness, wholeness, productivity, reason, heterosexism, the nation-state, and imperialism. My argument is not for them. I suggest thinking of economies as bodies so that those invested in valuing a range of diverse human bodies and relationships can claim our queer economies – our labors in service of queer desires – with the same ferocity that we claim our diverse, queer selves. Benefits of economic bodies The need for an ‘economies as bodies’ framework grew out of my research on two brands from so-called ‘ethical trade’: Café Femenino® and Product (Red)™ (Heiliger 2011, 2012, 2013). These brands and their campaigns are examples of a larger ‘ethical consumerism’ trend in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which is a social and economic phenomenon encouraging shoppers, primarily in the global North, to buy products that claim to make the world a better place for all. Gibson-Graham’s dismantling of monolithic ‘Capitalism’ into ‘capitalisms’ (1996) proved critical for describing ways Café Femenino’s Fair Trade economic processes differed from Product (Red)’s version of shopping for a social justice cause. However, once I began to analyse economic activities that blended market, alternative market, and nonmarket transactions, Gibson-Graham’s (1996, 2006) framework of diverse economies no longer effectively described what I observed. One flaw in Gibson-Graham’s description of diverse economies is its limited framing of diverse economies as consisting of transactions/labor/ enterprise, which are conceived as taking place in one of three places: (1) markets, (2) alternative markets, or (3) nonmarkets. Depending upon how economic exchanges are compensated, Gibson-Graham categorize economic activities as either (1) capitalist, (2) alternative capitalist, or (3) noncapitalist. Yet economic bodies do not fit neatly into any one of these categories as strictly capitalist, alternative capitalist, or noncapitalist. Instead, diverse economic bodies – including queer economies – overlap different areas of Gibson-Graham’s framework. The actions of economic bodies may include a combination of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities. Here, the metaphor of porousness is useful for understanding the ways that queer economies do not have defined boundaries around market, alternative market, and nonmarket activities. Rather, all three of these activities intermingle in queer economies to support nonnormative people as they pursue queer desires for surviving, thriving, and justice. Gibson-Graham’s framework of diverse economies may not preclude the matrix of queer economies. However, it does not adequately theorize the ways queer economies mix economic activities in pursuit of specific queer desires. Contemporary forms of trade such as ethical consumerism are a merger of capitalisms and alternatives such as Fair Trade (Heiliger 2011; Barnett et al. 2008). Instead of describing Café Femenino as functioning under a ‘subsystem of capitalism’ or Product (Red) as ‘a more ethical capitalism’, the framework of economic bodies catalogues each as its own economic body. Both are new economic bodies formed through an economic marriage. These are two different economies that have adapted quickly in response to critiques of globalization, and which play with one another on a global scale, as well as in local markets. In the coffee world, certified Fair Trade became more entrenched in legal documentation, a result that some considered a hindrance to the transformative possibilities of Fair Trade. In response, other forms of ‘ethical’ trade such as transparent contracts and direct trade spun off from Fair Trade and formed their own economic bodies, some of which continue to engage with formal, certified Fair Trade. Other economic bodies previously considered alternative have modified to more closely resemble conventional trade (e.g. Silk brand soy products). Economic offspring form just as human ones do: through unions sometimes clandestine, occasionally sexy, possibly expensive, but generally without much of note to alert the media. This merger of ideological interests (if not actual practices) and social justice concerns is strange. It strikes me that current bodies of ethical economies operate a bit like idealized liberal American upwardly mobile heterosexual couples: practical, yet kind. When I am asked to comment on Fair Trade’s radical potential, I can only say that I am in favor of Fair Trade in the same way that I am in favor of samesex marriage. Whereas same-sex marriage allows increased legal benefits, protections, and responsibilities to those who participate, certified Fair Trade provides increased access to global markets, some financial protection, and responsibilities to a cooperative or group of farmers. Yet it must be noted that both same-sex marriage and certified Fair Trade provide benefits only to those who fit a limited profile. To participate in same-sex marriage in the United States, one must have a recognized citizenship and a legally recognized gender, only one adult partner who consents to marry you, money for a marriage license, and access to a state government that permits same-sex marriage. Fair Trade is similarly limited to those who are privileged. To participate in Fair Trade, one must have certification of Fair Trade practices, ownership of or access to land to grow crops, membership in a cooperative, and access to income or assets. Fair Trade provides major social and economic benefits to farmers and producers who participate, yet Fair Trade does not intervene in the lives of the very poorest farmers in most cases (Jaffee 2007). Certainly there are social, legal, emotional, and economic benefits of both Fair Trade and gay marriage to those who participate. However, both are solutions that work within existing legal and economic structures, systems designed to privilege heterosexuality, whiteness, existing wealth, able-bodiedness, and the nation-state. It is undeniable that some people – some bodies – will never be qualified to participate in either project, whereas others will not want to. As Lyn Ossome argues in Chapter 7 of this volume, a teleological view of economic justice can blind observers to those who cannot ‘move forward’ in the prescribed way. Ossome additionally questions whether justice can possibly be held within the embrace of capitalism. I want to focus primarily on Ossome’s critique of attempting to locate justice within capitalism, for this leaves room to consider how justice might be struggled for across, through, and around capitalism by those who deliberately engage in queer economies – that is, a variety of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities motivated by queer desires – in order to survive and thrive. Therefore, I wish to stipulate that while a framework of economic bodies could chart progressive and liberal economies not usually visible within conventional economic discourse, more is needed to develop this concept in order to locate and describe radical, transformative, queer economies of desire. The next section elaborates on what I mean by queer economic bodies, and articulates ways these economies make queer survival possible. Queer desires multiply economic possibilities As I gather evidence of multiple, interrelated, queer economies through a process of witnessing, storytelling, and internet ‘eavesdropping’ (Facebook), it is obvious that queer people – using Cohen’s radical political potential to include a wide range of individuals – co-create communities and economies blending capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities into economic bodies. These economic bodies become queer economies if the blended activities are used to pursue queer desires shaped by (as Halberstam describes ‘queer’ to indicate) nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time. One example of this blending for queer desires is the Trans\*ition Fund Collective (T\*FC), a Tumblr begun in January, 2012 to ‘highlight the projects of trans\* individuals fundraising for their transition while sharing some awesome trans\*-friendly products and resources. Submissions are always welcome!’ (T\*FC; see website in notes at the end of the chapter). More than 15 individuals posted fundraising efforts and personal stories on T\*FC during the first month, primarily for surgery and follow-up care for themselves or a loved one. Some fundraisers sell pre-made items such as video games, sex toys, or books, while others offer their skills in trade or to personalize a special gift. Most create art such as t-shirts, screen prints, jewelry, and paintings to fund medical costs. The remaining Tumblr posts include resources, information about moderators Ariel and Codi, binder giveaways, and general encouragement of trans\* individuals. I classify the Trans\*ition Fund Collective as a queer economy because it is prompted by the nonnormative desire to medically change one’s body to better match one’s self-identified gender, and it blends capitalist (the medical-industrial complex), alternative capitalist (fundraising via Tumblr), and noncapitalist (bartering, trading, and gifting) economic activities. The T\*FC additionally manifests queer desires by not focusing solely on profit; its features include strengthening ties between individuals and their supporters via Tumblr. Its use of multiple economic processes (art, bartering, trade, gifting, collaborating, fundraising) alongside an engagement in the medical-industrial complex is an unconventional kind of economic arrangement, an economic body neither fully inside nor wholly outside a conventional profitmaking capitalism. Additionally, its relationship-building (supporting, connecting, communicating, promoting) across in-person and internet interactions provides a model of community engagement and transformation for other trans\* people. Porously queer economies One reason for the intermingling of various economic activities in a porous queer economy may be that the politically queer humans laboring in queer economies are themselves diverse and experience intersecting forms of systemic oppression that must be met with multiple forms of resistance. Engaging in different forms of economic activity – in different kinds of enterprise – is one strategy for resistance and survival. So, too, is engaging in a variety of relationships and forms of community. An example of a queer economy pursuing ‘nonnormative logics and community’ is a Tumblr called To the Other Side of Dreaming (TTOSOD; see website in notes at the end of the chapter). TTOSOD documents the journey of disability justice/transformative justice activists Mia Mingus and Stacey ‘Cripchick’ Milbern to move together from the US south to the Bay Area of California, despite immense economic and social limitations to mobility faced by people with disabilities. In pursuing this endeavor, they said to their communities in the blogosphere: [We] have decided to live together and create/cultivate interdependent queer disabled korean diasporic radical women of color home together. We are embarking on a journey together to put pieces of disability justice into practice, love each other and live on the other side of dreaming. A huge part of this is our need, as crips, as queers, and women of color, as korean (and all) diasporic people; we need each other and we need you. (TTOSOD) Mingus and Milbern ask for assistance finding affordable, accessible housing and creating a community care collective in Berkeley, California, to assist with Milbern’s needs until the state of CA approves her application and provides home assistive care. They transgress complicated state regulations and social norms that make it difficult for persons with disabilities to move. They explicitly name love and healing a variety of inter-related traumas as part of their relationship-building. The response towards To the Other Side of Dreaming in the first two weeks was remarkable: members of their online and in-person community offered advice and connections to affordable housing and began creating a schedule for a careshift collective. Some online community members sold books, while another friend organized an Etsy shop to raise money for their move and transition. The kinds of support To the Other Side of Dreaming required to prepare to move across the United States differs from the kinds of day-to-day support needed after moving and settling in. Questions of quantity of assistance as well as quality of relationships are critical. Enough people have to be involved to avoid burnout – and those who commit to assisting need to be honest about what they can contribute and for how long. Some ‘allies’ stuck around to provide access for less than six months, perhaps not knowing or caring how their absence can shift a situation of thriving to one of surviving. TTOSOD, as queer economy, relies particularly on creativity, flexibility, and interdependence, as well as access to money, able-bodied persons with access, and state services. In Chapter 7 of this volume, Lyn Ossome challenges the teleological view of most discussions of economic justice, and her arguments apply here: that TTOSOD remains a functioning queer economy, but one that defies the linear narrative of progress and invites the question whether rubbing queer economies against other queer economies is always or necessarily pleasurable, particularly when some economies operate from greater privileges. Queer economies, queer relationships Like other economic bodies, queer economies engage in relationship-making and a variety of economic processes for survival of nonnormative human bodies. Some of these processes may look like a poor imitation of capitalisms – for example, so-called ‘economies of affection’ with activities such as gifting, trading, bartering, trashpicking, and repurposing. However, I would argue they no more mock capitalisms than a dildo mocks a penis. Each of these noncapitalist exchanges offers relational pleasures and responsibilities. Profit-making is not the sole point of these economic activities. Relationships and tool-usage matter as much as form and purpose. Gibson-Graham (1999) and Escobar (1995) reveal that a Western ideological framework invisibilizes some economic activities, while denigrating and calling for the destruction of others. Success and survival within this context become linked to one’s ability to perform as an ideal ‘rational’ economic actor for capitalism. As Escobar has argued, ‘through economic sciences (classical political economy) and broader philosophical conceptions (derived from the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, empiricism), this system produced a certain subjectivity, namely, that embodied in the modern producing subject’ (2005: 142). Cultivating a sense of the profit motive was seen as a crucial component of becoming an ideal producer for the global market, while gift-giving, charity, bartering, and other forms of noncapitalist exchange were ridiculed as being non-rational and non-productive (Escobar 1995; Harvey 2005; Scott 1995). My fifth example of a queer economy embraces many ‘nonrational’ economic activities. Mobile Homecoming (MBHC) is designed by Dr. Alexis Pauline Gumbs, black queer feminist poet and revolutionary, and her partner, Julia Wallace, revolutionary black queer filmmaker, to record the stories of queer black elders in the US. They reached out to online and in-person communities to raise funds for a mobile home to travel to the homes of queer black elders to conduct interviews. Gumbs and Wallace build relationships and raise money through holding freedom schools, selling poetry and books, creating films and teaching resources available online for free and for sale, sharing meals, asking for donations of money, love, and support, and connecting with other queer radicals in North Carolina, USA, and around the globe. According to Gumbs and Wallace’s MBHC (see website in notes at the end of the chapter), the point of their work is to heal, love, and honor black queers, and to support other revolutionary relationships. MBHC is explicitly not a nonprofit. They write: We understand that the modes of survival in our black queer communities which include: – social support organizing – artistic creativity – spiritual transformation – revolutionary interpersonal relationships are our key resources as we transform the meaning of life. (MBHC website) MBHC is queer economy for its intentional mixing of monetary exchange, creative resourcefulness, and deliberate community-building meant to generate love and structural healing. Celebrating the full range of black queerness fundamentally shapes MBHC and affiliated projects. ‘Community’ is defined not by geographic boundaries, nor by boundaries around race or gender, but by reaching out to like-minded social revolutionaries working for justice. There are thousands of people who belong to Gumbs and Wallace’s community – their project of celebrating black queer love and honoring queer intergenerational connection through listening projects and recording history clearly speaks to many. This is one example of how queer economies function – through connections, networks of respect and mutuality, and by speaking truth to power. Because ‘the economy’ is never enough: desiring (more) queer economic bodies In this chapter, I analyse five examples of queer economies to begin to think through what makes queer economies queer, and what makes queer economies valuable. In considering what makes queer economies queer, first, they are a type of economic body animated by queer desires. Economic bodies are inherently relational. Second, queer economies differ conceptually from ‘the economy’, because they are not a singular, unified entity like ‘Capitalism’ – they are multiple and allow us to ‘have some more’. Third, queer economies differ from Gibson-Graham’s framing of multiple economies (as capitalisms, alternative capitalisms, or noncapitalisms) because queer economies – like many economic bodies – weave together two or more kinds of economic activities in pursuit of queer desires. Finally, queer economies function differently from other economic bodies because they focus on nonnormative arrangements of community and relationship-building while pursuing queer desires. The value of queer economies comes from this bundle of characteristics. The relationship-making aspects of queer economies are as important as their plurality and their blending of economic activities. Relationship-making – between people and between economies – enables queer economies to sidestep larger structural forces that disenfranchise queer people and thwart queer desires. Specifically, TTOSOD and MBHC name desires such as love and healing personal and structural wounds as key goals motivating the activities of their economic bodies. Attempting to diffuse or heal structural harms is also clear in T\*FC’s use of Tumblr to provide emotional support for trans\* youth who experience social pressure to pretend to be the sex/gender assigned to them at birth. Scavengers like my family and trashpickers in Los Angeles have a nonnormative relationship with trash, which pushes back against structural norms that insist ‘nice people’ spend money to pursue their desires or that those who don’t have money don’t deserve to thrive. One reason queer economies might be difficult to identify and describe is that many are utilizing forms of alternative and noncapitalist exchange that are typically categorized as non-economic. Queer economies work differently from how we have been taught that capitalisms function, even as queer economies operate through, within, and outside them. Therefore, queer economies have the potential to create justice through desires for nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time.12 This requires flexibility and creativity, as well as the pleasurable and often-difficult work of building relationships and being accountable for our actions. Re-theorizing economies as bodies is not merely an intellectual exercise – I mean to multiply our options for engaging in economic activities. Naming and describing queer economies makes clear the unconscious links between economies-as-bodies and the embodied persons laboring within them in service of queer desires. So I ask: what queer desires move your economic bodies? What relationships must you engage in to manifest your desires? With whom will your economic bodies collaborate, flirt, merge, avoid, fight, make up, bargain, or trade? What – or who – will your queer economies long for? Applying our ideas about human bodies leads to greater recognition of – and perhaps participation in – economies already animated by queer desires and justice. What will your queer economies do? Because ‘the economy’ simply isn’t enough to hold all your queer possibilities.

#### The aff offers liberal reformation of the *debate community* to naturalize an educational paradigm that perpetuates a social and economic order built on protocols of domination. It is insufficient now to ask “what do we learn from the aff’s education”; now we must ask “what kind of life do we want [this] education for”

Bourassa 19 **(**Gregory Bourassa, Assistant Professor of Social Foundations at the University of Northern Iowa, “Educational Biopolitics, Innovation, and Social Reproduction,” 2019, Springer Nature Singapore, Encyclopedia of Educational Innovation)

Reproduction theorists seek to understand schools as institutions that are implicated in the reproduction of ideologies, social relations, and divisions of labor necessary to sustain the existing social world. One of the key claims, then, is that schools are not neutral depoliticized sites, let alone great equalizers. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2011) make clear that schooling “has never been a potent force for economic equality” (p. 8). Rather it has reproduced inequalities while maintaining the pretense of equal opportunity. In investigating the school’s “role in hiding or justifying the exploitative nature of the U.S. economy,” their analysis rejects any nostalgic rhetoric about the democratic origins of public schooling and challenges liberal educational theory’s uncritical acceptance of the role of schools in transitioning students into a particular social order (p. 14). While reproduction theorists have paid close attention to how schools classify and organize students along the lines of race, class, and gender, Bowles and Gintis suggest that the origins of these types of inequalities “lies outside of education, in a system of economic power and privilege in which racial distinctions play an important role” (p. 35). This position challenges deficit theories that blame educational failure on teachers, students, and the communities to which they belong. On the contrary, inequality is understood to be endemic to capitalism, and therefore failure is not an accidental occurrence but a necessary feature of capitalist schooling. This understanding led Bowles and Gintis to explore the limits of liberal educational theory and “Band Aid” liberal reform efforts that failed to trouble the logics of capitalism or acknowledge how those logics were infused in the structure, organization, and rationale of schooling. Without coming to terms with this relation, liberal reform efforts “preserve the role of schooling in the perpetuation of economic order” (p. 152). The same conclusion must be drawn about educational innovation. If there were a central concept that Bowles and Gintis contributed to the larger field of social reproduction theory, it would be the correspondence principle. Theorizing the relation between schools and capitalism, Bowles and Gintis (2011) suggested that the “structure of social relations in education not only inures the student to the discipline of the work place, but develops the types of personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and social class identifications which are crucial ingredients of job adequacy” (p. 131). The correspondence principle helped to explain how school practices replicate hierarchal divisions of labor, not just in the technical sense of granting students different degrees of access within the occupational structure but also socially. For Bowles and Gintis, this meant that schools must be understood as sites for the management and organization of social, political, educational, and economic life. Put in terms that resonate with the literature in educational biopolitics, the correspondence principle not only highlights how schools reinforce relations of domination, but it offers some insight into how differentiated forms of educational life are cultivated, confined, valued, and devalued. Nonetheless, reproduction theorists, and particularly Bowles and Gintis, have been criticized for being too deterministic. The concern was that the correspondence principle neglected the ways in which students resist the social relations of capital as opposed to passively internalizing them. While the correspondence theory has its limits, Bowles and Gintis did not succumb to a deterministic account. While pointing to how the school system in the USA has served the interests of capital, they suggest that this is not a totalizing process, for schooling “also produces misfits and rebels” and has “given birth to a powerful radical movement and critique of capitalist society” (p. 12). While the focus of reproduction theory is how schools perpetuate the inequalities of the larger social order, Bowles and Gintis believed that education – following a larger transformation of the social order – could “unleash a people’s creative powers without recreating the oppressive poles of domination and subordinacy, self-esteem and self-hatred, affluence and deprivation” (p. 17). It is along these lines where there is some overlap with affirmative theories of educational biopolitics that seek to move beyond the “commodification, normalization, or abandonment of educational life” (Lewis 2006, p. 176). Educational Biopolitics While educational biopolitics builds on and extends the project of reproduction theorists, the precise relation between these traditions has been insufficiently explored (Bourassa 2017). This could be explained in part because the orientations and tendencies that were assumed and employed by reproduction theorists now maintain a strange status. In one sense, they are thought to be antiquated due to the perception that they neglect possibilities of agency and resistance and, at the same time, the basic insights they advance have undoubtedly, if only in implied form, seeped into other domains of critical educational studies, including educational biopolitics. However, a more obvious explanation for why these traditions are not more explicitly intertwined is that educational biopolitics owes much of its design to contemporary political theorists such as Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Michel Foucault, and Antonio Negri. While this has brought exciting theoretical tools to educational theory, it has also facilitated some problems, which I will briefly mention below. Studies in biopolitics take many divergent directions, and thus while there are variant uses of the term, most explore the intersections of life, politics, subjectivity, and power. This could involve attempts to understand the unequal distribution of life and death possibilities along lines of race, class, ability, gender, and sexuality and how such a distribution arranges and affects the terms of living. Or, it could involve explorations of collective forms of life that engender a new order where the condition of life for some is not predicated on conditions of death for others. Drawing off these different inflections, educational biopolitics has focused on how educational life is both vulnerable to the operations of biopower (a power over life) and a site of generative possibilities through which subjectivity breaks with the nexus of power relations, producing new possibilities for knowledge production and politics (Lewis 2006). Thus one of the most important contributions of educational biopolitics has been an exploration of how schools facilitate and manage forms of educational life and educational death (Bourassa 2017; Lewis 2006). This involves thinking about the political economy of life in schools and the ways in which some forms of life, modes of being, and ways of knowing are exalted while others are eradicated, contained, or rendered disposable. Clayton Pierce’s (2013) Education in the Age of Biocapitalism is a central text in this literature, and it starts with an earnest exploration to a familiar question: “What kind of life do we want education to be for?” (p. 38). Pierce demonstrates that the concept of educational life is deeply wedded to the imperatives of neoliberalism, so much so that students are regarded as “forms of biocapital to be managed, regulated, and optimized for greater value.” (p. 68). In an age of biocapitalism, where vast forms of life are increasingly put to use, schools are sites of extraction that optimize and manage human capital, treating educational life as a mineable resource. There are numerous problems with this arrangement. Forms of knowledge and ways of being that capitalism considers either superfluous or threatening are discarded and rendered disposable (Bourassa 2017; Lewis 2006; Pierce 2013). At stake is not simply a profoundly unequal economy of educational life that provides forms of protection for some and renders our most vulnerable even more insecure. In addition, the very types of life and subjective modalities that are cultivated should be regarded as a problem. In this way, as I suggest below, there is reason to be “against both the making and taking of educational life” (Bourassa 2017, p. 342). While Pierce has largely focused on the operations of biopower – as a power over life – and how educational life is subject to the neoliberal economic mandates that result in particular investments and disinvestments in educational subjects, Tyson Lewis (2006) demonstrates how disciplinary practices in schools attempt to reduce students (predominantly students of color) to bare life, “a life devoid of pedagogical supplement” in which “the student is reduced to nothing more than a body that must be policed” (p. 169). Lewis’ analysis demonstrates how schools, particularly in the USA, are spaces of biopower that employ the sovereign function of deciding which life is worthy of living and which life is not. However, Lewis also theorizes an affirmative biopolitics of education that forefronts the possibilities for new collective subjects that escape the control of power and overcome the death logics of the camp. This shift to an affirmative educational biopolitics is paramount, and, in ways that reflect the larger field of biopolitical studies, it has involved different approaches, namely, attempts to register the ways in which an already existing collective subject resists biopower or, alternatively, attempts to theorize new figures of subjectivity – a coming subject that is, for the most part, not yet. What is required now is more attention to the assumptions that underpin these approaches. This entails rethinking and exploring conceptions of corporeality and materialism with a keen sense of how some subjects, knowledge, and forms of politics are rendered intelligible, while others remain unintelligible. If the educational biopolitics literature cited above owes a large debt to Agamben, Esposito, Foucault, and Negri, it should also be noted that it has inherited their inattention to particular logics like ableism, for instance, resulting in profound absences and insensitivities to the ways in which schools produce disability and ableism. This is important not simply as a matter of indexing the political economy of life in schools but more fundamentally for appreciating how “crip/queer” bodies frustrate the conception of the normate subject and offer new forms of resistance to biopower, creating alternative modes of interaction that violate neoliberalism’s demands of productivity (Mitchell 2015). Methodologically, if an affirmative educational biopolitics is to reformulate agency, revolutionary subjectivity, and the power of life itself, then it must attend more closely to embodiment and the material efficacy of bodies, that is, to the role of corporeality in politics. Demystifying Educational Innovation: An Affirmative Biopolitics Beyond the Making and Taking of Educational Life Despite proclaimed concerns about the persistence of inequalities, the practices and technologies implemented under the guise of educational innovation are entangled with commitments to preserving a capitalist future. They preserve a capitalist future while also utilizing a social justice narrative of inclusion that promises to make, and more equitably distribute, educational life. For many, the making of educational life may appear as the antidote to the taking of educational life that is evident in disciplinary practices that punish and abandon marginalized youth, rendering them disposable. Studies in educational biopolitics, however, recognize the making of life as one of the primary functions of biopower (Bourassa 2017). It is the first part of a complex equation: to make live and to let die. As mentioned earlier, educational innovation must be read through the lens of biopower as a project to maximize human capital and manage educational, social, and economic life. Both reproduction theory and educational biopolitics critically orient scholars in relation to educational innovation and attune them to the ways in which the making of educational life is always accompanied by “the process of letting die – a form of disinvestment in the educational life of a large number of students” (Bourassa 2017, p. 337). This is the one and only true promissory logic of capitalist schooling. An affirmative educational biopolitics does not task itself with making life but rather with engendering or conserving the conditions under which educational life can cultivate new figures of subjectivity and alternative educational logics, knowledge, politics, and collective ways of being. An affirmative educational biopolitics pushes us to expand the horizon of possibilities and break with the logics of biopower that parse proper and improper subjects, knowledge, ways of being, and ways of knowing. It rejects the instrumental and teleological conceptions of education for human capital and calls for new imaginaries and politics that nourish arrangements of being that are for, and in the service of, life itself. At a moment when educational innovation looms large, reproduction theories and studies in educational biopolitics offer indispensable tools. Pierce’s (2013) question, “What kind of life do we want education to be for?” should be at the center of any conversation related to educational innovation, and it should be accompanied by a repudiation of responses that narrowly link education with economic viability and the development of human capital (p. 38). As a framework for inquiry, studies in educational biopolitics are crucial at this moment because they understand schools as sites that do more than transmit content and skills. They recognize that schools are contested sites of struggle over the production, reproduction, and management of life. If educational innovation is marshaled to preserve a capitalist future, educators and educational researchers must address the ways in which the violence and injuries of capitalism are differentially distributed across lines of race, class, gender, sexuality, and ability. This involves attending to the hidden and not-sohidden logics of white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, coloniality, ableism, and their intersecting coordinates. The task is not to simply challenge curricular and pedagogical enclosures but to understand how ontological and epistemological enclosures have always been at the heart of capitalist schooling. Because these enclosures increasingly happen under the guise of educational innovation, inclusion, or even social justice, educators must be knowledgeable in their local contexts in order to understand and refuse the specific logics, institutional technologies, and operations of biopower that inform the spaces they inhabit. It is only through such collective refusals – refusals nourished by an astute recognition of the complexities of our contemporary moment – that an affirmative educational biopolitics can emerge, disrupt the normative operations of schooling, usher forth new educational logics, and collectively invent what happens next.

### 1NC CP – Aymara

#### CP Text: Istadus unidos ukampirus jan masi pashna.

#### CP solves

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### 1NC Case

#### Court circumvention---they ignore intent and plain meaning, reject literature bias towards optimism.

Crane ‘21 [Daniel A Crane. Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am very grateful for many helpful comments from Tom Arthur, Jonathan Baker, Steve Calkins, Dale Collins, Eleanor Fox, Rebecca Haw, Hiba Hafiz, Jack Kirkwood, Bob Lande, Christopher Leslie, Alan Meese, Steve Ross, Danny Sokol, and other participants at the University of Florida Summer Antitrust Workshop. "ANTITRUST ANTITEXTUALISM." https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4952&context=ndlr]

This view is so widely entrenched in the legal profession’s understanding of the antitrust laws—including, it must be admitted, this author’s—that it seems presumptuous to claim that the conventional wisdom is wrong, or at least significantly overstated. But it is. While the antitrust statutes may be lacking in some important particulars, they present a readily discernable meaning on many others. As Daniel Farber and Brett McDonnell have argued, “For the conscientious textualist, the statutory texts [of the antitrust laws] have considerably more specific meaning than the conventional wisdom would suggest.”5 And it is not simply the case that the meaning of the statutory texts could be rendered through ordinary methods of statutory interpretation but the courts have failed to see it. Rather, the courts frequently acknowledge that the statutory texts have a plain meaning, and then refuse to follow it.

But it gets worse. The courts have not merely abandoned statutory textualism or other modes of faithful interpretation out of a commitment to a dynamic common-law process. Rather, they have departed from text and original meaning in one consistent direction—toward reading down the antitrust statutes in favor of big business. As detailed in this Article, this unilateral process began almost immediately upon the promulgation of the Sherman Act and continues to this day. In brief: within their first decade of antitrust jurisprudence, the courts read an atextual rule of reason into section 1 of the Sherman Act to transform an absolute prohibition on agreements restraining trade into a flexible standard often invoked to bless large business combinations; after Congress passed two reform statutes in 1914, the courts incrementally read much of the textual distinctiveness out of the statutes to lessen their anticorporate bite; the courts have read the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act almost out of existence; and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments of 1950, faithfully followed in the years immediately after their promulgation, have been watered down to textually unrecognizable levels by judicial interpretation and agency practice. It is no exaggeration to say that not one of the principal substantive antitrust statutes has been consistently interpreted by the courts in a way faithful to its text or legislative intent, and that the arc of antitrust antitexualism has bent always in favor of capital.

#### The aff’s analysis of corporations ignores the importance of Native acquisitions that are critical to growth and self-determination. Their homogenization bankrupts natives at the alter of socialism.

Sweeping critiques of capitalism always ignore the specificity of tribal sovereignty through casino gaming.

Cattelino 11 (Jessica R. ““One Hamburger at a Time” Revisiting the State-Society Divide with the Seminole Tribe of Florida and Hard Rock International” Current Anthropology Volume 52, Number S3 Supplement to April 2011 Corporate Lives: New Perspectives on the Social Life of the Corporate Form: Edited by Damani J. Partridge, Marina Welker, and Rebecca Hardin)

This article examines Florida Seminole corporations and tribal government gaming together as a case study of the production of the state-society divide. In 2007, the Seminole Tribe of Florida acquired Hard Rock International, a major corporation with cafés, hotels, and casinos around the globe. This $965-million deal, which remains the largest purchase of a corporation by an indigenous nation, created a media storm and extended Seminoles' geographical and financial reach far beyond reservation borders. Like Seminole casino gaming, which is possible only because of tribal sovereignty, the Hard Rock deal called attention to the fuzzy boundaries of indigenous corporate and national forms. This has been the case insofar as Seminoles' governmental statues as a sovereign undergirds some of their economic activities while impeding others. Seminole corporations and tribal gaming show the project of differentiating economy from government and family to be a cultural and historical one that creates distinct yet broadly relevant dilemmas for indigenous peoples in the United States.

On December 6, 2006, the Seminole Tribe of Florida shocked the business world by announcing an agreement to acquire Hard Rock International, a multinational corporation, for approximately $965 million. Yet this was not the first groundbreaking business news to come from Seminole country: in December 1979, Seminoles opened Hollywood Seminole Bingo, the first tribally run high-stakes bingo hall in Native North America. That act launched a rapid transition from endemic poverty to economic comfort on Seminoles' (population approximately 3,500) six South Florida reservations, and it paved the way for other tribal nations to follow suit in what would become a tribal gaming revolution. Indeed, when I phoned to learn more about the Hard Rock acquisition from tribal counsel Jim Shore, the first Seminole to become a lawyer, he mentioned having encouraged press release drafters to compare the deal with bingo's launch. Both instances, he said, showed the Seminole Tribe to be a “pioneer” in business (December 12, 2006, interview).1

In one respect, acquiring Hard Rock was a very different proposition than opening Hollywood Seminole Bingo: the latter was a governmental operation on reservation lands that was permissible because of and protected by tribal sovereignty. As sovereigns, American Indian nations have the right to operate and regulate reservation economic activities, which are not taxable by other sovereigns such as states or the federal government. By contrast, Hard Rock would remain a wholly owned private corporation subject to taxation and regulation just like any other company. Still, what brings together these two forms of economic organization and what also ties them to the earlier 1957 adoption of a charter to form a Seminole economic development corporation is that each marked an innovation in the relationship between governance and economy for American Indian tribal nations.

This article examines Seminoles' ownership of Hard Rock as a case study in the blurry boundaries between indigenous corporate and national forms and as a broader exploration of the analytical and political stakes of efforts to segregate the economic sphere from government and family. This work extends previous ethnographic fieldwork (12 months in 2000–2001 and numerous shorter periods thereafter) on Seminole gaming and sovereignty conducted on the Tribe's six rural and urban reservations with tribal council permission (Cattelino 2008). Seminole Hard Rock raises classic questions of how and with what effects law, social theory, and popular ideology draw—and struggle over—distinctions between state and society, with uneven consequences for different populations and peoples. These questions, which apply broadly to the social scientific study of corporations, go back at least to Karl Polanyi's (2001 [1944]) historical and cross-cultural (Polanyi 1957) examinations of the institutions that shape economic processes and political scientist Timothy Mitchell's (1999, 2002) explorations of how the seemingly autonomous sphere of “the economy” emerged through political and representational processes inseparable from the nation-state and colonialism. Yet the wide scope and historical depth of these issues do not obviate analysis of the cultural specificity of Seminole economic organization. To the contrary, the seemingly exceptional characteristics of indigenous corporations bring to the fore matters of culture, kinship, and local governance that too often are ignored in the study of corporations. Seminoles' acquisition of Hard Rock shows the project of differentiating economy, government, and family to be a cultural and historical one that creates dilemmas for indigenous peoples in the United States, peoples whose governmental status often undergirds their economic activities.

John and Jean Comaroff (2009) recently wrote about the global salience of what they call “Ethnicity, Inc.” It is a process, they argue, that entails a dialectic: “One element of that process lies in the incorporation of identity, the rendering of ethnicized populations into corporations of one kind or another; the second, in the creeping commodification of their cultural products and practices” (21). That is, ethnicity and the corporation merge when groups consolidate by virtue of their business projects (they cite American Indian tribal gaming by groups that previously were not federally recognized) or when ethnic groups such as San in South Africa market their culture. In this dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture, they further argue, each seeks to complete itself in the other (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:116). For American Indians, the corporate form has been available and utilized for governance ever since the modern business corporation became widespread in the early twentieth century. Indigenous corporations have taken many twists and turns, some of which better fit the Comaroff model than others. As such, a historical and ethnographic perspective is required. As we shall see, federal-government-promoted indigenous incorporation sometimes erodes traditional tribal governments and at other times reinforces and restructures them. Indigenous-initiated corporations, on the other hand, generally are the by-product of sovereignty assertions. Tribal sovereignty sometimes has afforded American Indians the space to experiment with corporate forms that reinforce social and cultural ties in different ways from the examples cited by Comaroff and Comaroff. At the same time, tribal corporations' need to be interpretable to outside economic actors (such as credit rating agencies and investors) encourages the practical and ideological separation of business from politics, culture, and family. The modernist project of separating economic spheres from political ones is vast, and Seminole corporations contribute to its social scientific analysis an example of the real-time production of the state-society divide.

#### Native casinos decrease mortality by 22 per 100K through improving economic outcomes.

Evans & Topoleski 02 (William N. Evans and Julie H. Topoleski, September 2002. Keough-Hesburge Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame; and Congressional Budget Office. “THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERICAN CASINOS,” National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9198.pdf.)

In the final two columns of Table 10, we report results from models using the mortality rate as the dependent variable. In both counties with a casino and counties within 50 miles of a casino, we see statistically insignificant declines in mortality for the first three years after a casino opens. By four or more years after a casino opens, however, mortality has fallen by 22 per 100,000 in a county with a casino and an amount half that in counties near a casino. These results are 2.3 and one percent of sample medians in counties that experience a casino opening, respectively. These results can be driven by changes in economic activity, but this is probably not the whole story. Above, we showed that four years after a casino opens in a county, employment to adults ratio increases by 3.8 percent and here, we find mortality falls by 2.3, so for the mortality change to be drive solely by a change in jobs, the implied mortality/jobs elasticity must be -0.60.

#### Reject any link turns

Fremstad & Stegman 15 (Shawn Fremstad and Erik Stegman, 1/21/2015.  Senior Fellow with the Center for American Progress and a Senior Research Associate with the Center for Economic and Policy Research; and an expert in American Indian and Alaska Native policy at the Center for American Progress. “Of Stereotypes and Slack Reporting Standards: The Economist’s Claim that Native American Gaming Leads to “Sloth”,” Talk Poverty, http://talkpoverty.org/2015/01/21/economist-sloth-native-american/.)

In his [extensive research](http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo3633527.html), Princeton political scientist Martin Gilens shows how “racial stereotypes have played a central role in generating opposition” to economic security programs in the United States. As Gilens notes, “In particular, the centuries-old stereotype of blacks as lazy remains credible for large numbers of white Americans.” Gilens concludes “racial distortions in the media’s coverage of poverty are largely responsible for public misperceptions of the poor.”

Gilens’ book was published in 1999. In our view, media coverage of poverty has improved since then. This is probably due to increased diversity in the new media and as well as a better understanding—as a result of the work of Gilens, [Shanto Iyengar](http://www.communicationcache.com/uploads/1/0/8/8/10887248/framing_responsibility_for_political_issues-_the_case_of_poverty.pdf), and [others](http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472068319-ch5.pdf)—of how distorted media representations can negatively affect public perception of policy issues.

But an [article](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21639547-how-cash-casinos-makes-native-americans-poorer-slots-and-sloth) in this week’s The Economist is a reminder that we haven’t put the bad old days of racially distorted coverage of poverty beyond us. The article claims “cash from casinos makes Native Americans poorer.” According to the author, a particular problem is that tribes distribute part of the revenues directly to members—typically known as “per capita payments”—which encourages “sloth.” The article is accompanied by a photograph of an American Indian man in front of a slot machine, a grin on his face and his arm pumped in the air.

Given research like Gilens’ and the long history of stereotyping American Indians as lazy, The Economist should have been particularly careful to ensure that it had solid evidence to back up its claim. In lieu of such evidence, The Economist relied on a few anecdotes and a single article by a private attorney published in a student-run law review.

We took a closer look at the law review article that The Economist relied on and were not impressed. It purportedly shows that poverty was more likely to increase in certain Pacific Northwest tribes that distributed part of their gambling revenues to members than in those that did not. But there were only seven tribes (out of a total of 17 that the article focused on) that did not distribute gaming revenues directly to members. The total reported decline in poverty among these seven tribes amounted to only 364 people. The study contained no controls for any of the many factors that affect poverty rates, nor did it take into account size differences in the tribes, differences in the size and structure of the per capita payments, or other relevant factors. In short, the study is absolutely useless in terms of providing meaningful evidence to support The Economist’s claim.

Even worse, The Economist failed to mention the existence [of rigorous, peer-reviewed research](http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/does-money-affect-childrens-outcomes) contradicting the article’s thesis. Unlike the single paper cited in the article, this research uses methodologies designed to isolate the causal effects of per capita payments and generally finds that they have positive effects on poverty and other indicators of children’s well-being. For example, [research](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2891175/) by William Copeland and Elizabeth Costello, both professors at Duke University, uses longitudinal data that tracks both American Indian and non-American Indian children in western North Carolina. After the introduction of a per capita payment for American Indian families, they documented “an overall improvement in the outcomes of the American Indian children while those of the non-[American] Indian children … remained mostly stable.” Strikingly, educational outcomes for American Indian children “converged to that of the non-[American] Indians,” and the arrest rate of American Indian children fell below that of non-American Indians.

Similarly, in research using the same data set published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Costello and her colleagues found that poverty declined among American Indian families after the introduction of per capita payments and also led to improvements in children’s behavioral health.

In addition to research that examines per capita payments, there is a larger body of rigorous research looking at the overall effect of gaming on poverty, employment, and other indicators of well-being. On balance, this research finds positive effects. For example, University of Maryland economists William Evans and Julie Topoleski [compared outcomes](http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6645837.pdf) in tribes that opened casinos with those that did not.  Among tribes that opened casinos, Evans and Topoleski found increases in population and employment, declines in poverty, and some improvements in health. Similarly, Barbara Wolfe and her colleagues [found](http://rwjscholars.pophealth.wisc.edu/docs/Wolfe-et-al-The-Incom-and-Health-Effects-of-Tribal-Casino-Gaming-on-American-Indians-D.pdf) that being a member of a gaming tribe “leads to higher income, fewer risky health behaviors, better physical health, and perhaps increased access to healthy care.”

1. Charles Darwin, “The Origin of Species” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. David Brooks, “The Nuclear Family Was a Mistake,” March 2020, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/03/the-nuclear-family-was-a-mistake/605536/ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)